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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19447 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
CLAUDIA SCHACHTER-DeCHABERT, for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (JOHN H. GROSS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rockviiie Centre Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Rockviiie Centre Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
UFT, AFL-CIO (Association). The ALJ held that the District violated §209-a.1 (a) and (c) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it terminated the 
probationary employment of a teacher assistant, Cathlyn Rooney, because she 
exercised rights protected by the Act. 
The ALJ determined that Rooney was terminated August 1, 1997, at the end of 
her second year as a teacher assistant, because of her protected activities during the 
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1996-1997 school year related to her membership on the Association's negotiating 
team. Although the District's earlier evaluations of Rooney were very positive, she 
received an evaluation for the 1996-1997 school year that listed several incidents upon 
which her supervisor, Principal Joanne Spencer, based her decision to recommend that 
Rooney beterminated: The ALJ determined that the timing of the events was suspect 
and, based upon her credibility resolutions, that the District's stated reasons for 
terminating Rooney were pretextual. The ALJ decided that Rooney had been 
terminated because of her actions on behalf of the Association. The District was 
ordered to offer reinstatement to Rooney, to make her whole for any lost wages or 
benefits and to cease and desist from any interference with Rooney's exercise of 
protected rights. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that her credibility resolutions 
are in error and her decision is based upon timing and conjecture, insufficient bases for 
the finding of a discriminatory discharge in violation of §209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
In May 1997, at the end of her second year as a teacher assistant employed by 
the District at Hewitt Elementary School, (hereafter Hewitt), Rooney received an 
evaluation from Spencer rating her as "outstanding" in two categories, "satisfactory" in 
eight categories, "needs improvement" in two areas and "unsatisfactory" in two. 
Spencer told Rooney that she was going to recommend to William Johnson, the 
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Superintendent of Schools, that Rooney be terminated. On June 20, 1997, Rooney 
received a letter from Johnson informing her that, based on the information he had 
received from Spencer, he would recommend termination of her probationary 
appointment to the Board of Education. Thereafter, Rooney received a letter dated July 
9, 1997, terminating her appointment effective August 31, 1997. 
In Town of Independence? the standard of proof in cases alleging a violation of 
§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act was clearly stated: 
It is well settled that the elements necessary to prove a case 
of discrimination for union activity under the Act are that the 
affected individual was engaged in protected activity, that 
such activity was known to the person(s) making the 
adverse employment decision, and that the action would not 
have been taken but for the protected activity. The existence 
of anti-union animus may be established by statements or 
by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
presentation of legitimate business reasons for the action 
taken, unless found to be pretextual. (Footnote omitted) 
As to the first prong of the test, there is no dispute that Rooney was engaged in 
protected activity during the 1996-1997 school year. She became a member of the 
Association's negotiating team in late June 1996. On September 11, 1996, she 
circulated a questionnaire to other teacher assistants, returnable to her mailbox at 
Hewitt, soliciting information to be used for negotiations proposals, she wore a "unity" 
button,2 and was active at Association meetings held at Hewitt. At the beginning of the 
123 PERB H3020, at 3038 (1990). 
2The Association was beginning negotiations with the District for the teacher 
assistants' first contract. 
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1996-1997 school year, she wrote to Rooney asking if the teacher assistants would be 
able to utilize Friday hours on half days as had been done in the past. Spencer 
declined her request. 
Turning to the second prong of the test, it must be determined when Spencer 
became aware* of Roohey's activities on behalf of the Ass^^ 
exceptions argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Spencer knew about Rooney's 
union activities in September 1996. It is undisputed that at least by November 1996, 
Spencer was shown the September 11 letter to Association members authored by 
Rooney, soliciting information about working conditions.3 Spencer admitted that at that 
time she concluded that Rooney was involved in the Association, but it was not until 
August 1997, when she saw Rooney at a negotiations session, that she learned that 
Rooney was on the negotiating team. However, the document that Rooney was shown 
in November 1996 begins with the statement: "I volunteered to represent the 
elementary teacher assistants during our contract negotiations...." From that, the ALJ 
concluded that from November 1996, Spencer knew that Rooney was involved in 
Association activities. The ALJ further concluded that Spencer probably knew that 
Rooney had become actively involved in the Association even earlier. 
There is insufficient evidence in the record to support this conclusion and we 
hereby reject it. It is sufficient for the purposes of our decision to find that Spencer was 
3The document was shown to Spencer by another elementary school principal. 
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aware of Rooney's activities in May 1997, when Rooney was evaluated by Spencer and 
when Spencer recommended that Rooney be terminated. 
Having found that Rooney was engaged in protected activity and that Spencer 
had knowledge of Rooney's activities, the ALJ determined that Rooney would not have 
been "terminated "but for" her union involvement. We disagree. 
Rooney's termination was based upon Spencer's evaluation and her 
recommendation to the Superintendent of Schools. If Rooney would not have received 
her negative evaluation "but for" her Association activities, then the evaluation would 
have been improper and the subsequent termination that was based upon that 
evaluation would likewise have been improper.4 We find that Spencer's negative 
evaluation of Rooney was reflective of Spencer's honest evaluation of her work. As the 
ALJ found, we too find that the record is devoid of overt acts or statements of anti-union 
animus.5 While in cases alleging discriminatory treatment there are rarely open 
4
 See Croton-Harmon Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB P086 (1998), where we 
held that where there is an improperly motivated request for employment action, or an 
employment action that is based upon information gleaned from an improperly 
motivated investigation, the action itself may be found to be violative of the Act, even if 
that request or information is acted upon by an individual or body without improper 
motivation. See also Town of Gates, 15 PERB 1J3079 (1982); Elmira City Sch. Dist, 
14 PERB 1f3015 (1981). 
5The ALJ relied, in part, on the testimony of Gloria Pinella, the former vice-
president of the Association, who was assigned to Hewitt and was supervised by 
Spencer. Pinella testified that both before and after her tenure as vice-president, her 
relationship with Spencer was cordial and friendly. During the time she heid the 
position of vice-president of the Association, Spencer's attitude toward her was cool 
and polite. Pinella stated that she was too afraid of Spencer to testify without a 
subpoena, even though she no longer worked for the District. Pinella offered no 
reasons for her "fear". We place no weight on the witness' conclusory "fear" statement 
and, even accepting her statement as to her perception of the change in Spencer's 
attitude towards her, we do not find it inappropriate given the change in their 
professional relationship, and certainly no evidence of animus. 
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statements against a union or the exercise of protected rights or specific threats of 
retaliation,6 even considering the timing of the alleged retaliatory action, there is 
insufficient evidence to establish a violation. 
Rooney's termination was based upon Spencer's 1996-1997 evaluation, which 
relied upon several incidents involve duhnglhe course of the 
1996-1997 school year. The first incident happened on the first day of school when 
Spencer told Rooney to pack up some books and leave them for the school custodian 
to move. At the suggestion of the custodian, Rooney instead put the books on a cart 
and moved them to the storage area. As Rooney pushed the cart through the halls, it 
made some noise. Spencer chastised Rooney for being disruptive and for disregarding 
her instructions. She informed Rooney in writing that this was unacceptable behavior. 
Rooney responded that she and a teacher chose to follow the custodian's suggestion 
instead. 
The second incident involved several of the teacher assistants assigned to 
Hewitt. All were scheduled to attend a meeting to be conducted by Spencer on 
October 1, 1996, a Teacher Conference Day. After waiting for Spencer to arrive, the 
teacher assistants left. Two who left after one hour signed out. Rooney and two 
others, who left much later, did not sign out but notified Spencer's secretary that they 
were leaving. At the direction of the Superintendent, those who left without signing out 
were spoken to by Spencer the next day. In Rooney's evaluation, Spencer outlined this 
6City of Utica, 24 PERB ^3044 (1991); City of Utica, 21 PERB 1J3066, affg 
21 PERB 1J4580 (1988). 
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incident and referred to a second incident where she felt it was necessary to counsel 
Rooney about signing out. 
This second incident involved a situation in October when Rooney needed to 
leave early for a medical appointment of a family member. She went to speak to 
"Spencer Being| informed that Spencer was in a meeting, she left the^message with 
Spencer's secretary that she needed to leave early. Spencer later that day spoke to 
Rooney, questioning her need to leave, her lack of notice, and her failure to make 
coverage arrangements for her students. Both testified that Spencer did not deny 
permission to Rooney to leave early. James Pepe, the Association President, testified 
that shortly after this incident, he received a telephone call from Joseph Dragone, the 
Assistant Superintendent of Schools, advising him that Spencer was upset with Rooney 
for asking for emergency leave with insufficient notice. Dragone assured Pepe that 
Spencer's behavior had nothing to do with Rooney's participation in negotiations. 
Dragone's comments to Pepe that Spencer's upset was not union related evidences 
only that Dragone was aware that Rooney was involved in negotiations. Dragone 
credibly testified that he did not mean to infer that Spencer held any union animus. 
The third incident involves a student accident in March 1997. Rooney and a 
student were sitting on a stair landing when another student came down the stairs. 
About half way down the flight of stairs, the student fell. Rooney went to the student to 
ascertain her condition. She asked another teacher to get help. The ALJ found that 
Rooney told the student not to sit up, but when the student persisted with her request to 
do so, Rooney allowed it. The teacher-in-charge and the Head Custodian arrived and, 
after checking the student's condition, had the student walk to the office, where ice was 
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applied to the injury. At Spencer's request, Rooney prepared a written statement in 
which she was extremely brief and recited very few facts. Spencer also had the 
teacher, custodian and school nurse prepare reports. Their reports differ from 
Rooney's in that they refer to the child telling them that she was attempting to "climb 
over" Rooney and the other sturle'nt"WheTi'~sh"'e_feir." They also mention that the student 
told them that Rooney had instructed her to sit up. Spencer wrote Rooney a 
memorandum advising her to stop working in the stairwells with students and to never 
attempt to move a student who had been injured. Rooney did not produce any 
statements from the child she was working with, nor did she dispute that the child who 
fell gave the statements that were attributed to her. In Rooney's evaluation, Spencer 
characterizes the incident as being a matter of grave concern, illustrating Rooney's 
inability "to adapt her behaviors to meet expected standards." Contrary to the opinion 
of the ALJ, we find that the District conducted an investigation of the incident sufficient 
for Spencer to conclude that Rooney was not completely honest with her about it. The 
actions of the District were reasonable, if not all that could have been done, and 
Spencer's conclusions were those that a reasonable person in her situation could fairly 
reach, without any discriminatory motive or intent. 
The final criticism by Spencer in Rooney's evaluation is Rooney's need to 
maintain order when working with small groups of children or when supervising children 
during bus duty. As noted by the ALJ, in the same evaluation for 1996-1997, Spencer 
rated Rooney as "satisfactory" in working well with students on a one-to-one basis and 
in small groups. Even if we were inclined to disregard this one of the several reasons 
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given for Rooney's discharge, the others would certainly form sufficient basis for the 
discharge of a probationary employee. 
Rooney responded in writing to Spencer's evaluation. Those comments were 
not forwarded to Johnson by Spencer when she sent Rooney's evaluation and her 
Recommendation that Rooney be terminated. In his June 20, 1997 Tetter to Rdohey 
explaining the reasons why her probationary appointment was to be terminated, 
Johnson responded by listing the book cart incident, "several" occasions when Rooney 
left school without signing out, and the repeated counseling sessions conducted by 
Spencer concerning procedures for maintaining order among students under her 
supervision. Rooney responded to Johnson, suggesting for the first time that Spencer's 
recommendation might be based upon Rooney's union activities. Rooney testified that 
it never occurred to her that Spencer might have been motivated by union animus until 
a fellow employee suggested it to her after her discharge. The fact that no union 
animus was apparent to the alleged victim, or, for that matter, to her unit president, 
through the counseling sessions, memos and recommendation for discharge, supports 
the conclusion that none existed and that the issue was raised only after the discharge 
in an attempt to have Rooney reinstated. 
The ALJ found that the reasons offered by the District in support of its decision to 
terminate Rooney's probationary appointment were pretextual and that the actual 
reason was her union activities. We disagree. The record does not support the ALJ's 
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determination in this regard. Although the agency may choose to do so, it need not 
defer to either the factual or legal determinations of its ALJs.7 
"To establish the improper motivation necessary for a finding that section 209-a. 
1(a) and (c) of the Act have been violated, the charging party has the burden of proving 
engagement in protected activities, that the -employer-had- knowledge of the activities 
and that it acted because of those activities."8 Here, the ALJ summarized the charge 
as an allegation that the District had violated the Act "by terminating the employment of 
probationary teacher assistant Cathlyn Rooney in retaliation for her union activity." 
(emphasis added). No connection was established in this case between Rooney's 
union activity and the principal's evaluation and recommendation for termination of her 
probationary employment. Thus, the Association failed to establish the third necessary 
element of proof to sustain the charge, even assuming the other two had been met. It 
is only when the charging party meets its burden on each of the three elements of proof 
that the respondent must then rebut that proof and demonstrate that its conduct was for 
proper business reasons.9 
The ALJ recognized that, "[a]s before PERB, 'bad faith' is that which violates the 
Act or, stated otherwise, is that taken in retaliation for protected activity", citing to Board 
of Education of the City School District of the Citv of New York. 26 PERB 1J4555, aff'd 
26 PERB 1J3082 (1993). The cited case also stands for the proposition that the ultimate 
7See e.g., Simpson v. Wolansky, 38 N.Y.2d 391, 380 N.Y.S.2d 630, 343 N.E.2d 
274(1975). 
^Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 29 PERB fi3022, at 3051-52, citing to City of 
Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). 
9Town of Independence, supra note 1, at 3038 (1990). 
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burden of persuasion is always with the charging party to establish that the respondent 
would not have taken the adverse action in the absence of protected activity. 
This record shows that there were several incidents involving Rooney which 
subjected her to Spencer's criticism during the 1996-1997 school year. Spencer used 
those incidents as the basis of-her evaluation-and her recommendation that Rooney be 
terminated. The ALJ concludes that except for the student accident in March 1997, the 
incidents cited by Spencer were of relatively minor significance (the book cart incident), 
involved other employees who were not cited for the same conduct in their evaluations 
(the failure to sign-out on Teacher Conference Day) or have no documentary support 
(the counseling sessions on maintaining order). We are not willing to draw the same 
conclusions. Insubordination and failure to comply with mandatory time-keeping 
requirements are not trivial matters and certainly the principal could reasonably 
conclude, as did the Association's own witness, that arranging to leave the school 
during the workday without sufficient advance notice and without providing for 
substitute coverage was unprofessional. To the extent that other employees were 
involved in similar activities, they were treated similarly. 
While the March 1997 student accident was not one of the reasons given by 
Johnson for Rooney's termination, the District's explanation for that omission was 
reasonable and credible. As stated earlier, we find Spencer's conclusion that Rooney 
had lied to her about the incident to be reasonable based on the disinterested reports of 
Rooney's co-workers. 
Finally, there was another teacher assistant at Hewitt, who was not active in the 
Association, whose 1996-1997 evaluation appeared to be worse than Rooney's and 
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she was not terminated.10 Closer examination reveals no incidents similar to Rooney's 
reported in that evaluation. Given such, the two employees cannot be said to be 
similarly situated. 
The ALJ's conclusions from the evidence are just that: conclusions. Rather than 
credibility-determinations, the ALJ's decision is based chiefly on the ALJ's subjective 
evaluation of the seriousness of the District's reasons for discharge. Although the ALJ 
acknowledged the wide latitude the courts have granted municipal employers with 
respect to termination of probationary employees, her conclusion that the conduct 
alleged herein "should" not form the basis for discharge is a personal, rather than legal, 
conclusion. The charges proven in this case would clearly survive legal challenge for 
sufficiency as a basis for discharging a probationary employee.11 In rejecting the ALJ's 
conclusion about the sufficiency of the conduct, the argument that the "minor" nature of 
those charges supports a conclusion that the charges were pretextual must also fail. 
We find, and conclude, were we compelled to reach the issue, that there were 
legitimate business reasons for the charges against Rooney. There is little dispute that 
the incidents occurred, that they were recorded contemporaneously with the events and 
that they were, for the most part, the subject of written or verbal counseling. 
10That teacher was marked "unsatisfactory" in two categories and "needs 
improvement" in three categories. Rooney was "unsatisfactory" in two categories and 
"needs improvement" in two categories. 
11See Education Law §2573 and cases arising thereunder which provide that a 
probationary teacher may be terminated at will and for no reason. Pascal v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the City of New York, 100 A.D.2d 622 (2nd Dep't 1984). See also Bd. of Educ. 
Cent. Sch. Dist. No.1 of the Town of Grand Island, 37 A.D.2d 493 (4th Dep't 1971). 
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Based on the foregoing, the District's exceptions are granted, the decision of the 
ALJ is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. So ordered. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
MichaeLR. Cuevas, Chairman 
M / /Mr 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 891, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19515 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK, LIPTON, WATANABE, SPIVAK & MOSS L.L.P. (ADRIENNE L. 
) SALDANA and NEIL LIPTON of counsel), for Charging Party 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (ROBERT E. 
WATERS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it imposed a condition precedent upon the commencement 
of negotiations for a successor agreement to its 1990-1994 contract with Local 891, 
International Union of Operating Engineers (Union). The Union has filed cross-
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exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of its allegation that the District had intentionally 
delayed the start of negotiations by failing to agree to dates for negotiations. 
The ALJ found that the District had impermissibly conditioned negotiations for a 
successor contract upon the settlement of a dispute between the parties on the amount 
of funds to be contributed by the District to an equity fund established pursuant to the 
parties' 1990-1994 collective bargaining agreement (equity fund). The ALJ dismissed 
an allegation that the District had intentionally delayed and impeded the start of 
negotiations by not agreeing to dates proposed by the Union. The ALJ found that most 
of the allegation was untimely and as to those requests for dates that fell within four 
months of the filing of the improper practice charge, the record was unclear as to 
whether it was the District or the Union that was responsible for any delays. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's determination that it refused to commence 
negotiations for the successor to the 1990-1994 contract. The District argues that the 
condition it sought to impose - agreement on the amount of the District's payment to the 
equity fund - did not evidence a failure to negotiate in good faith in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act. The District further argues that the Union refused to negotiate 
in good faith about the equity fund and that the ALJ erred in not considering this 
affirmative defense. In all other respects, the District supports the ALJ's decision. 
The Union excepts to the ALJ's finding that its allegation that the District 
intentionally delayed negotiations was, in most respects, untimely and that, as to the 
timely allegations that the District intentionally delayed negotiations, the Union excepts 
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to the ALJ's finding that the District and the Union were jointly responsible for the 
delays. The Union supports the other findings of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the 
ALJ's decision. 
The Union and the District are parties to a "collective bargaining agreement for 
the term July 1, 1990 to December 31,1994. The parties entered into the agreement on 
November 1, 1994, which was thereafter ratified by both parties and implemented by 
the District. The contract establishes an "Equity Fund and Additions to Gross" to which 
the District contributes two sums of money, one amount to the equity fund and another 
amount to the additions to gross. These contributions support three programs: an 
^ affirmative action program, a peer intervention program and a custodian professional 
skill program. A labor-management committee determines the distribution of any 
monies remaining after the designated programs are funded. The committee is 
comprised of two Union representatives, one representative from the District and one 
representative from the City of New York (City). 
By 1996, the parties were in disagreement about the amount to be contributed 
by the District. The District claimed that an agreement had been reached in 1995 about 
the amount to be contributed for 1996, which included an offset to the District's 
contribution based upon the level of participation by Union members in a retirement 
incentive program. The Union claimed that no such agreement had been reached. 
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In 1996 the City scheduled the first date for negotiations for a successor 
agreement. Sessions scheduled for March 16 and May 7,1996 were canceled by the 
City and the District, respectively. No attempts were made thereafter to reschedule any 
negotiating sessions until October 10, 1996, when Neil Lipton, the Union's attorney 
wrote to David Bass, then Deputy Executive Director of the District's Division of Labor 
Relations and Collective Bargaining, requesting that negotiations for a successor to the 
1990-1994 contract be scheduled. Thereafter, the Union sought on several occasions 
through October 1997 to schedule negotiating sessions.1 From late 1996 through the 
spring of 1997, the District attempted to schedule sessions with the Union to negotiate 
the issues in dispute regarding the equity fund. In the spring of 1997, the District also 
sought to schedule sessions for the negotiation of the successor contract. 
Finally, in October 1997, Lipton wrote to Dale Kutzbach, the District's Director of 
Labor Relations, seeking to schedule bargaining sessions for the successor agreement 
and sessions to discuss the equity fund. Lipton noted in his letter that the parties 
needed "to conclude agreement on outstanding issues concerning [the] Equity Fund 
agreement" and that they should "finish this remaining outstanding item from the 
negotiations for the 1990-1994 agreement". 
1
 Lipton received an October 25, 1996 response to his inquiry from Simon 
Gourdine, the District's Chief Executive for Labor Relations, that the District would 
contact the Union with dates as soon as its proposals were ready. Lipton, having heard 
nothing, wrote on April 4, 1997, requesting dates. He wrote again on May 5, 1997 
requesting the initiation of negotiations. Gourdine replied by letter dated May 7, 1997 
that the District would like to have the Union's proposals for review at their initial 
meeting. 
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Kutzbach responded by letter dated October 17, 1997, that he needed to look 
into the equity fund issue and that he was not aware that there was any outstanding 
issue from the 1990-1994 contract negotiations. He advised Lipton that that issue 
should be resolved before negotiations for a successor agreement commenced. 
The parties met on November 17, 1997 to discuss equity fund issues. At the end 
of the meeting, Lipton inquired about setting a date for contract negotiations. Kutzbach 
responded that the District would not agree to commence negotiations for the 
successor agreement until negotiations for the 1990-1994 contract were completed, 
referring to the issues in dispute between the parties about the amount of the District's 
contribution to the equity fund and how any remaining funds would be allocated. 
The ALJ determined that the District had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by 
improperly conditioning negotiations for a successor contract upon resolution of the 
equity fund issues that had arisen in 1996, finding that to so condition negotiations 
upon a condition precedent violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. The District 
argues that the ALJ erred by not looking at the "totality of conduct" of the parties and by 
not addressing its affirmative defense that the Union's own conduct with respect to the 
equity fund left the matter unresolved. 
It is well-settled that parties must approach negotiations with "a sincere desire to 
reach an agreement".2 A party violates the Act when it conditions the commencement 
2Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB fl3020, at 3049 (1994); Town of 
Southampton, 2 PERB 1|3011, at 3274 (1969). 
Board - U-19515 -6 
of negotiations upon agreement on other issues, such as ground rules,3 or the 
resolution of other issues, such as funding4 or finalization of a prior agreement.5 Here, it 
is undisputed that the parties had agreed to all the terms of the 1990-1994 contract, it 
had been ratified and it had been implemented. The District's argument that the 1990-
1994 contract had not been settled is not supported by the record and cannot provide a 
defense to its refusal to agree to commence negotiations for a successor agreement. 
The District's defense that the Union is at fault for delaying agreement on the 
issues in dispute regarding the equity fund is likewise without merit. The Union 
attempted to schedule meetings with the District to resolve the amount to be 
contributed by the District and the distribution of any remaining funds and, in fact, the 
parties did meet on several occasions. That the parties had not reached agreement on 
these issues is no defense to the District's refusal to even commence negotiations for a 
successor agreement. While a respondent is free to raise any affirmative defense in its 
answer, we cannot find on the facts of this case that the Union's actions provide a 
viable defense to the District's refusal to negotiate.6 If, as the District asserts, the 
Union's actions equal a violation of the Act, it could have filed an improper practice 
* Addison Teachers Ass'n, 19 PERB1J3062 (1986). 
4Union Free Sen. Dist. No. 11, Town of Greenburgh, 5 PERB |f3044 (1972). 
5Waverly Cent. Sch. Dist, 10 PERB 1J3103 (1977). 
5See Bath Cent. Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J3026 (1990); Albany Prof'l Permanent 
Firefighters Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 4 PERB 1J3071 (1971). 
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charge making those allegations, as we have previously held that a respondent cannot 
seek affirmative relief in a pleading other than an improper practice charge.7 
In its exceptions, the District argues that this Board adopted a "two-way street" 
approach to bargaining in our decision in City of Cohoes (hereafter Cohoes),8 because 
we there held that 
we cannot countenance a negotiations policy which produces or continues 
a "one-way street" of negotiability under which only one party may force 
negotiations about any particular subject, whether it be "one-way" for 
employers or for unions.9 
The District argues that to require it to negotiate for a successor to the 1990-1994 
contract would be to allow one party's bad faith to disadvantage the other party at the 
bargaining table, in effect allowing one party to force negotiations upon the other party. 
The District's reliance on Cohoes as support for its refusal to negotiate a successor 
agreement is in error. Cohoes dealt with the conversion theory of negotiability; it had 
nothing to do with bad faith bargaining based upon the conduct of a party. Indeed, the 
District's insistence that the Union negotiate and resolve all equity fund issues prior to 
commencing bargaining for a successor agreement is precisely the type of one-sided 
bargaining, bargaining controlled by one party at the expense of another, that the 
District claims is improper. 
7See City of Glens Falls, 30 PERB H3047 (1997). 
831 PERB H3020(1998). 
9/d.,at3039. 
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We find, therefore, that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it 
insisted that there would be no bargaining for a successor contract to the 1990-1994 
contract until the issues in dispute arising out of that contract were resolved. 
The ALJ dismissed the allegation that the District had intentionally delayed the 
start of negotiations by failing to respond to the Union's requests to schedule bargaining 
sessions. As to those allegations which occurred prior to May 30, 1997, the ALJ found 
them to be untimely, having occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the 
charge.10 As to those allegations which occurred within four months of the filing of the 
charge, the ALJ determined that the record showed that both the District and the Union 
were responsible for any subsequent delays in scheduling negotiations. The Union 
argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing as untimely certain of these allegations 
because the District did not plead timeliness as an affirmative defense to the charge 
and the untimeliness of this aspect of the charge did not first become apparent at the 
hearing. 
The charge was initially processed by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director).11 The District did not raise timeliness in its 
answer as required by §204.3(c)(2) of the Rules. Therefore, the ALJ could dismiss the 
charge as untimely only if the untimeliness of the charge was revealed to the ALJ for 
10Section 204.1 (a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires that an improper 
practice charge be filed within four months of the occurrence of the act alleged to be 
improper. 
11Under §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is to review and dismiss a charge if 
he concludes that the violation alleged occurred more than four months before the 
charge was filed. 
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the first time at the hearing.12 The dates alleged by the Union to have been the dates 
when it attempted to schedule negotiations with the District are set forth on the face of 
the charge. No other evidence was presented at the hearing to reveal the untimeliness 
of the charge. The ALJ was not, therefore, permitted under the Rules to raise timeliness 
on her own motion.13 
It is clear from the record that, as to the dates alleged prior to May 30, 1997, 
there is no support for a finding of a violation by the District in delaying the start of 
negotiations.14 Both the Union and the District let time elapse in the communications 
with each other. On only one occasion did the District fail to respond to a letter of 
inquiry by Lipton.15 While we do not countenance a delay of over five months in 
responding to correspondence requesting the initiation of negotiations, based on the 
totality of the circumstances of this case, we do not find that the District's delay in 
responding to Upton's October 10, 1996 letter violates the Act.16 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision regarding the District's 
insistence that the equity fund issues be negotiated before it would agree to schedule 
negotiations for a successor agreement to the 1990-1994 contract is affirmed to the 
12
 Section 212.4(1) (formerly §204.7(1) of our Rules), which was amended 
effective July 21, 1999. 
13See County of Westchester, 29 PERB fl3003 (1996). 
uSee Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3035 (1999). 
15There was a delay of approximately six months between Upton's letter of 
October 10, 1996, and Gourdine's reply to Upton's April 4 and May 5, 1997 follow-up 
letters. 
16See City of Dunkirk, 25 PERB 1J3029 (1992). 
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extent it is consistent with our holding. The decision of the ALJ, dismissing as untimely 
the allegations in the charge related to the Union's attempts, before May 30, 1997, to 
schedule negotiations for a successor to the 1990-1994 contract, is reversed. The 
ALJ's decision dismissing the Union's allegation that the District delayed bargaining is 
affirmed forTheTreasons; set forth above. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Negotiate in good faith with the Union for a successor collective bargaining 
agreement without first requiring the parties to resolve their dispute concerning the 
equity fund. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with Unit employees. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc^A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (District) in the unit represented by Local 891, International Union of Operating 
Engineers, AFL-CIO (Union) that the District will forthwith negotiate in good faith with the Union 
for a successor to the 1990-1994 collective bargaining agreement without first requiring the 
parties to resolve their dispute concerning the equity fund. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NASSAU SHERIFF'S OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19797 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
CERTILMAN, BALIN, ADLER & HYMAN (MICHAEL C. AXELROD of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BEE, EISMAN & READY (PETER BEE and PETER FISHBEIN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Nassau Sheriffs Officers 
Association, Inc. (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its improper practice charge. The charge was filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), the bargaining 
representative at that time for the unit including the at-issue employees. After the ALJ 
issued the decision, CSEA was decertified as the representative of the corporals and 
the Association was certified as their representative. 
The charge alleges that the County of Nassau (County) violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to negotiate the 
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impact of an order by the Nassau County Sheriff (Sheriff) changing shift starting and 
ending times and restricting the number of corporals who may be granted vacation 
leave on the same day. The Association excepts to the decision of the ALJ, arguing that 
there has been no waiver of the Association's right to negotiate the impact of the 
County's change in shift schedules. The County has filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision finding that the County violated the Act when the Sheriff issued an order 
restricting the number of corporals who may be granted nonvacation leave on the same 
day. 
The Sheriff issued a departmental order on December 5, 1997, effective 
January 1, 1998, changing the starting and ending times for both shifts of corporals 
assigned to the security platoon division of the County Department of Correction.1 In 
addition, under the order, after January 1,-1998, no more than two corporals could be 
out on vacation leave at the same time and only one corporal at any time could be out 
on nonvacation leave.2 CSEA demanded to negotiate the impact of the changes made 
by the Sheriff's order. The County refused CSEA's demands.3 
1Priorto January 1, 1998, the morning shift began at 8:30 a.m. and ended at 
4:00 p.m. and the afternoon shift started at 3:30 p.m. and ended at 12:00 a.m. Since 
January 1, 1998, the morning shift is 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and the afternoon shift is 
2:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. 
2Underthe prior practice, a certain percentage of corporals and corrections 
officers couid be on leave at the same time. This practice allowed as many as seven or 
eight corporals to be granted leave status on the same day. 
3The County raised timeliness as a defense to the charge. The ALJ determined 
that the charge was timely filed and the County has not excepted to this aspect of the 
ALJ's decision. 
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The ALJ held that the CSEA-County 1995-1997 contract granted to the County 
the right to regulate work schedules and to grant vacation leave at its administrative 
convenience. Relying on our decision in County of Nassau (Police Department) 
(hereafter County of Nassau),4 the ALJ concluded that CSEA had agreed that the 
County could implement changes in schedules and vacation leave and that an 
agreement on the foreseeable impact of such changes was implicit in the contract.5 
However, the ALJ determined that the contract was silent as to the manner in which 
other leave was to be granted, and that the County, therefore, had not satisfied its duty 
to negotiate the impact of changes in the manner in which it grants corporals the right to 
use nonvacation leave. 
Based on a review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ, in part, and reverse in part. 
The 1995-1997 contract between the County and CSEA contains several 
provisions that are relevant to this charge: 
Section 4. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS. Except as validly limited by 
this Agreement, the County reserves the right to 
determine the standards of service to be offered by its 
various agencies; to set the standards of selection for 
employment; to direct its employees; to regulate work 
schedules; to take disciplinary action; to relieve its 
employees from duty because of lack of work or for 
431 PERBP064(1998). 
5The ALJ pointed to the contractual provisions that limited the County's discretion 
in changing shifts (Section 18), provided that vacation would be granted in accordance 
with the administrative needs of the department (Section 42-4[a]), and established 
payment for unused vacation leave (Section 42-4[b]). 
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other legitimate reasons; to maintain the efficiency of 
governmental operations; to determine the methods, 
means and personnel by which governmental 
operations are to be conducted; to determine the 
content of job classifications; to take all necessary 
actions to carry out its mission in emergencies; and to 
exercise complete control and discretion over its 
organization and the technology of performing its 
work. 
Section 5. WAIVER - ZIPPER. The County and the Union, for 
the life of this Agreement, each voluntarily and 
unconditionally agree that the other shall not be 
obligated to negotiate collectively with respect to any 
subject or matter referred to or covered in this 
Agreement, or with respect to any subject or matter 
not specifically referred to or covered in this 
Agreement, even though such subject or matter may 
not have been within the knowledge or contemplation 
of either or both of the parties at the time they 
negotiated or signed this Agreement. This shall not be 
construed to apply to negotiations for future 
collectively negotiated agreements between the 
parties, or to re-negotiations of health or dental 
benefits in the event that another County negotiating 
unit improves its health or dental benefits, or re-
negotiation of amendments to Section 2-5.2 of this 
Agreement. 
Section 9. ADMINISTRATION OF AGREEMENT. 
9-2.2 Department heads may promulgate departmental 
practices, procedures, rules and regulations. 
However, pursuant to Section 5 of the Agreement, 
said practices, procedures, rules and regulations shall 
not conflict with, exceed nor supersede this 
Agreement. 
Section 42 LEAVE WITH PAY. 
42-4 GRANTING OF, OR CHARGING TO, VACATION 
TIME. 
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(a) Vacation time may be granted in consecutive days, 
single days, or minimum units of one-quarter (1/4) 
days. However, vacation time shall be granted only in 
accordance with the administrative needs of the 
department. 
(b) An employee who has accumulated the maximum 
vacation time of eighty (80) days and is prevented by 
the administrative needs of the department from using 
the employee's yearly vacation entitlements, as 
accrued prior to the employee's anniversary date, shall 
be paid straight time for the vacation time over eighty 
(80) days, so lost, and, in addition, straight time for the 
time period. 
The ALJ determined that the above provisions gave the County the right to 
change shifts and grant vacation leave time consistent with its administrative needs. The 
ALJ also found that these sections of the contract addressed the impact on employees 
of a change of shift or the denial of a vacation leave request. Thus, the ALJ found that 
the County had satisfied its duty to negotiate any reasonably foreseeable impact of 
these changes. The ALJ's decision in this regard is consistent with our decision in 
County of Nassau, where we held: 
Like all bargaining obligations, however, an employer's duty 
to negotiate the mandatorily negotiable effects of its 
managerial decisions can be satisfied, (at 3142) 
Here, the County has negotiated for the right to set work schedules and to set the 
conditions for the use of vacation leave. Any impact issues arising from the exercise of 
the County's contractually recognized rights in this regard have been settled "upon the 
totality of the terms and conditions, financial and otherwise, contained within the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement."6 This is not an issue of waiver, as characterized by 
the Association, but an issue of duty satisfaction. 
Supra, at 3142-43. 
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Although waiver may accurately describe a loss of right such 
as one relinquished by silence, inaction, or certain other 
types of conduct the defense as described is not one under 
which a respondent is claiming that the charging party has 
suffered or should be made to suffer a loss of right. Under 
this particular defense, a respondent is claiming affirmatively 
that it and the charging party have already negotiated the 
subject(s) at issue and have reached an agreement as to 
how"the subject(s) is to betreated, at least for the duration
 0 f 
the parties' agreement. By expressing this particular defense 
as duty satisfaction, we give a better recognition to the 
factual circumstances actually giving rise to it and expect to 
avoid the confusion and imprecision in analysis which have 
sometimes been caused by the other noted characterizations 
of this defense.7 
The ALJ, however, did not reach the same conclusion with respect to the impact 
of the change in the conditions for the use of nonvacation leave. The ALJ found that the 
contract did not address the manner in which nonvacation leave is granted. Thus, the 
ALJ found that the County had not satisfied its duty to bargain the impact of any change 
in the manner in which it grants non-vacation leave. 
The County argues, however, that the Management Rights clause (Section 4), the 
Waiver-Zipper clause (Section 5) and the Administration of the Agreement clause 
(Section 9-2.2) allow it to set schedules and to determine how many employees are to 
be on duty and how many may use leave of any kind at any time. It argues that these 
provisions must be read together with the several clauses in the contract dealing with 
nonvacation leave - including sick leave, personal leave, supplemental leave and 
authorized leave with pay - and the related contractual provisions about abuse of such 
leave, accruals of unused leave and pay for unused leave. When these provisions are 
read together, the contract evidences that the County has also satisfied its duty to 
7
 Id. At 3142. 
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bargain the impact of any changes in the way in which nonvacation leave may be 
requested and used. We agree. 
Several sections of the contract, over nine pages, address, both explicitly and 
implicitly, the manner in which nonvacation leave is earned, accrued, granted, used and 
charged.8 The contract also embodies the parties' agreement as to payment for unused 
leave or its conversion into other types of leave. Thus, it is difficult to imagine any 
issues regarding the impact of a change in the use of nonvacation leave that the 
contract does not address. CSEA agreed by entering into the contract that issues 
related to the use of nonvacation leave impacted by a change in the number of staff on 
duty at a given time were satisfied, given all the considerations in the contract. 
Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's decision as it relates to the impact of the change in 
shifts and restricts the number of corporals who may use vacation leave at the same 
time. We reverse the ALJ's decision as it relates to the impact of the County's change in 
the number of corporals who may use nonvacation leave at the same time. 
8Sections 42-5 through 43-2 of the 1995-1997 contract deal with sick leave, sick 
leave abuse, excess sick leave accrual, charges against sick leave, supplemental leave 
at half pay, termination day, authorized absence with pay, jury duty leave, military 
leave, absences for extraordinary circumstances, child care leave, bereavement leave, 
blood days and leave without pay. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
-8 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas,"Chairman' 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
£. 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTHONY FARELLA, SR., 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20450 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, 
DIVISION 580, AFL-CIO and 
CENTRAL NEW YORK REGIONAL 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
Respondents. 
YUSUF J. NURALDIN, for Charging Party 
BLITMAN & KING, LLP (CHARLES E. BLITMAN of counsel), for 
Respondent Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 580, AFL-CIO 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (CRAIG M. 
ATLAS of counsel), for Respondent Central New York Regional 
Transportation Authority 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Anthony Farella, Sr. to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his charge which alleges that the 
Central New York Regional Transportation Authority (CENTRO) violated §209-a.1(a), 
(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and that the 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 580, AFL-CIO (Union) violated §209-a.2(a), (b) 
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and (c) of the Act in their handling of a seniority grievance he filed.1 Both the Union and 
CENTRO filed answers denying the material allegations of the charge and raising 
several affirmative defenses. Farella's motion for particularization of the Union's and 
CENTRO's answers was denied by the ALJ as being untimely filed. 
After a pre-hearing conference, at which all parties were present arid 
represented, the ALJ directed Farella to file an offer of proof by March 2, 1999, as to 
the evidence he would present in support of his charge. Instead, Farella filed another 
motion for particularization of both the Union's and CENTRO's answers. Because that 
motion might have caused some confusion about the time for filing the offer of proof, 
the ALJ extended Farella's time to file until March 25, 1999. 
On April 25, 1999, the ALJ received a letter from Nuraldin, Farella's 
representative, in which he refused to file the offer of proof, questioned the ALJ's 
authority to direct him to do so, and reiterated his procedural and constitutional 
objections to the manner in which the charge was being processed. CENTRO 
thereafter moved to have the charge dismissed for failure to prosecute. The ALJ then 
dismissed the charge for failure to prosecute, citing Nuraldin's refusal to submit an offer 
of proof. 
1Upon his initial review of the charge, pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) informed the parties that "the facts as alleged appear only to support the 
Section 209-a.2(c) charge against the union, and only that part of the overall charge will 
be processed". 
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Farella excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the charge was improperly 
limited to the alleged §209-a.2(c) violation against the Union, that the ALJ engaged in 
ex parte communications at the pre-hearing conference, that the pre-hearing 
conference was improperly conducted, that the ALJ did not have the authority to require 
an offer of proof, that theALJ was prejudiced against Fa^ and that 
the manner in which the charge was processed violated Farella's state and federal 
constitutional rights. CENTRO filed a response, supporting the ALJ's decision and 
arguing that the processing of the charge had been fair and proper. The Union did not 
file a response to the exceptions. Farella then filed a "reply brief to respondent's cross-
exceptions".2 
Based upon a review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The issue before us initially is only whether the ALJ's dismissal of the charge for 
failure to prosecute was an abuse of discretion. If the charge was properly dismissed 
for failure to prosecute, Farella's other objections become moot. On the basis of the 
record before us, we conclude that the ALJ's dismissal of the charge was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
2CENTRO filed only a response to Farella's exceptions to the ALJ's decision, 
not cross-exceptions. Section 213.3 of our Rules, as amended in July 1999 (previously 
§204.11), provides that only exceptions, a response to exceptions, cross-exceptions or 
a response to cross-exceptions will be accepted unless we authorize another pleading. 
As there were no cross-exceptions filed, and as we did not request or authorize a reply 
to CENTRO's brief, Farella's reply will not be considered. 
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It is well-settled that an ALJ has the discretion while processing an improper 
practice charge, either at a pre-hearing conference, after the conference, during the 
hearing or at any other appropriate juncture, to require a party to submit an offer of 
proof in support of the allegations being processed.3 
It: became clear to the ALJ at the pre-hearing conference that Farella and the 
Union had a difference of opinion about the meaning of the contractual provisions and 
the practices of the Union in determining seniority for bidding purposes. Farella had 
filed a grievance when he was not allowed to bid in accordance with what he believed 
was his seniority date. His grievance was denied by CENTRO and the Union furnished 
him with an explanation of its interpretation of the contractual provisions and the 
practices regarding seniority dates. 
As a mere difference of opinion between an employee and an employee 
organization about the interpretation of a contractual provision or a practice is not 
sufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation in violation of §209-
a.2(c) of the Act,4 the ALJ appropriately directed Farella to file an offer of proof as to 
what other facts he would offer in support of the alleged violation of the Act. Even 
though Fareila's representative instead filed a second motion for particularization of the 
answers, the ALJ afforded him another opportunity to comply with the directive to file an 
3New York State Security and Law Enforcement Employees Council 82, 
AFSCME, 29 PERB 1J3015 (1996); Nanuet Union Free Sch. Dist, 17 PERB P005 
(1984); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 16 PERB 1J3067 
(1983); Village of Spring Valley Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 14 PERB 1J3010 (1981). 
4Dist. Council 37, AFSCME, 28 PERB fi3062 (1995). 
Board - U-20450 -5 
offer of proof. Rather than follow the ALJ's directive, Farella's representative 
responded that there was no authority in PERB's Rules for an ALJ to require an offer of 
proof. 
The Notice of Conference sent to all parties to an improper practice charge alerts 
the parties thaTone of the ALJ's roles at the pre-hearing conference is to "attempt to 
assist the parties in resolving the matter or in entering into a stipulation of facts which 
may eliminate or limit the need for a formal hearing."5 In furtherance of this purpose, 
the ALJ has the discretion to direct one or more of the parties to file an offer of proof to 
enable the ALJ to determine whether the facts to be presented are legally sufficient to 
support the allegations made by a party. Inherent in this discretion is the ability of the 
ALJ to dismiss a pleading before or during the hearing based upon what is included in 
the offer of proof6, or to dismiss a pleading because of a refusal or a failure to file an 
offer of proof.7 
5The former Rules, §204.6, in effect at the time this charge was being processed 
by the ALJ, also stresses that one of the purpose of a conference is to clarify the 
issues. As amended in July 1999, this section is now §212.2. Any reference to the 
purposes of a conference was eliminated from the new Rule because of the potential of 
it being seen as a possible limitation on the purposes of a pre-hearing conference. 
Clarification of the issues is a purpose of the pre-hearing conference, but it is only one 
of the many reasons for the conference, which include, for example, settlement of the 
dispute, narrowing the issues in dispute, and discussions pertaining to the scheduling 
and conduct of the hearing. 
6See New York City Transit Auth., 30 PERB P004 (1997), where the Board 
affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of a defense raised by the Authority based upon its offer of 
proof in support of the defense. 
7See City of Niagara Falls, 23 PERB P039 (1990), where the Board affirmed the 
ALJ's deicsion to close the record and issue a decision upon the charge alone when the 
City failed to file an offer of proof setting forth the facts it would introduce to establish its 
defense to the improper practice charge after the ALJ had directed it to do so. 
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As we noted in United Federation of Teachers (Armatas):8 
A charging party who takes it upon himself or herself to 
refuse to participate in a PERB proceeding because of an 
adverse ruling does so at his or her peril because such a 
refusal constitutes a failure to prosecute the charge and may 
result in the dismissal of the charge. 
Here, it is Farella's refusal to file an offer of proof after specifically being directed to do 
so by the ALJ that constitutes the failure to prosecute warranting the dismissal of the 
charge.9 
Farella makes several allegations against the ALJ in the processing of the 
charge and the conduct of the pre-hearing conference. Although these are serious 
allegations, they do not excuse his refusal to prosecute the charge. Farella had several 
avenues open to him to raise his objections to the processing of his charge. He could 
have made a motion to have the ALJ recuse himself,10 he could have raised his 
objections to either the Director or to this Board or he could have raised his objections 
in exceptions after the ALJ issued a final decision pursuant to the offer of proof and/or a 
hearing.11 By refusing to comply with the ALJ's directive, Farella forfeited the 
opportunity to have his charge heard on the merits. 
831 PERB P042, at 3092 (1998). 
9See Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000 (Konopka), 27 PERB 1J3032 
(1994). 
10A motion to have an ALJ recuse himself/herself is made pursuant to §212.4(g) 
of our Rules, as amended in July 1999. (Formerly §204.7(h)(1)). 
11See City of Rye, 13 PERB P039, cont'd sub nom. Banahan v. PERB, 13 
PERB lf7012 (Sup. Ct. Albany County. 1980). See also Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. 
Dist. of the City of New York, 15 PERB 1J3042 (1982). 
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Based on the foregoing, Farella's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision 
is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
-Mafc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-ClO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4871 
TOWN OF SOMERS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
Certification - C-4871 page 2 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: General Foreman, Mechanics Helper, Heavy Motor Equipment 
Operator, Motor Equipment Operator, Laborer, Road Maintainer, 
and all blue collar employees of the Town of Somers Highway 
Department. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. AbbottTMember" 
T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4879 
TOWN OF ELMA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 264, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and regular part-time employees who work a minimum 
of 20 hours per week in the Departments of Highway, Water, 
Waste Water and Transfer Station, employed in the following titles: 
Water Maintenance Worker, Sewer Maintenance Worker, Motor 
Equipment Operator, Laborer, Caretaker. 
Excluded: Water Superintendent, Highway Superintendent, Water Grew 
Chief, Seasonal Employees, Casual and Temporary Employees, 
Part-timers employed less than 20 hours per week, and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 264, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4884 
COUNTY OF ORANGE, 
Employer, 
-and-
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Orange County Deputy Sheriffs' Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
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) 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff and Recruit, Deputy Sheriff and 
Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff Investigator, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant 
Investigator and Warrant Officer. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Orange County Deputy Sheriffs' Police Benevolent 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
C 
oin T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SENECA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C- 4886 
COUNTY OF SENECA, 
Employer, 
-and-
SENECA COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Seneca County Deputy Sheriffs Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
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and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.1 
Included: All full-time employees in the position of deputy sheriff and 
sergeant. 
Excluded: Sheriff, undersheriff, correction officer, senior correction officer, 
dispatcher, civil deputy, cook, all clerical positions, and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Seneca County Deputy Sheriffs Police Benevolent 
Association . The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Jdhn T. Mitchell, Member 
-During the processing of the petition, the Intervenor disclaimed any interest in 
appearing on a ballot or otherwise participating in the matter. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 17, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4900 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN, 
Employer, 
-and-
SULLIVAN COUNTY EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
Certification C-4900 2— 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Laborers International Union of North 
America, Local 17, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time, and part-time employees who work more than 
20 hours per week and four months per year or four 
consecutive months, or earn at least 50% of the annual 
salaries of their regular job classification, in the following 
titles: Account Clerk, Account Clerk (Licensed 
Weighmaster), Account Clerk-Typist, Airport Attendant, 
Assistant Sign Installer, Auto Body Repairer, Automotive 
Equipment Attendant, Blaster, Bridge Carpenter, Bridge 
Maintainer I, Bridge Maintainer II, Building Maintenance 
Mechanic, Building Technician, Carpenter, Clerk, 
Construction Equipment Operator I, Construction Equipment 
Operator II, Construction Equipment Operator III, Crane 
Operator, Custodial Worker, Custodian, Electrician, 
Electronic Technician, Engineering Aide, Engineering 
Technician, Equipment Painter, Grounds Maintenance 
Worker I, Grounds Maintenance Worker II, Hydraulic 
Excavation Equipment Operator, Junior Civil Engineer, 
Laborer I, Laborer II, Laborer III, Land and Claims Adjuster, 
Maintenance Assistant, Mason, Master Mechanic, Mechanic, 
Mechanic's Helper, Motor Equipment Operator, Municipal 
Director of Weights and Measures, Payroll Clerk, Principal 
Account Clerk, Principal Payroll Clerk, Recycling 
Coordinator, Senior Account Clerk, Senior Account 
Clerk-Typist, Senior Master Mechanic, Senior Payroll Clerk, 
Senior Stockkeeper, Senior Typist, Senior Weather 
Observer, Sign Installer, Sign Shop Painter I, Sign Shop 
Painter II, Stockkeeper, Tire Changer, Traffic Safety 
Technician, Transfer Station Attendant, Transfer Station 
Operator, Typist, Weather Observer, Welder I, Welder II. 
Excluded: Temporary, seasonal and all other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Laborers International Union of North America, Local 17. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negptiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4908 
MONROE #2-ORLEANS BOCES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: Maintenance Mechanic (all series), Custodian (all series), Cleaner 
(all series), Groundsmen (all series). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 16, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ ivlafc^AVAIzfebtt.'lvlember 
/Joriin T. Mitchell, Member 
